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I. Introduction
Clayvin Herrera is a registered member of the Crow Tribe of Indians and
resides on the Crow Reservation in Montana.1 In January of 2014, Herrera and
his hunting party pursued a herd of elk across a fence, exiting the Montana Crow
Reservation and entering the Bighorn National Forest in Wyoming.2 Without a
Wyoming hunting license, Herrera and the party harvested three bull elk during
a closed season and transported the meat back to Montana.3 Under Wyoming
law, authorities charged Herrera with two misdemeanor game violations.4 A
jury then criminally convicted Herrera of harvesting the elk within Wyoming in
contravention of Wyoming law.5 Herrera, however, contested his conviction on
the ground that he possessed the right to hunt and kill the elk based on his Tribal
membership under The Second Treaty of Fort Laramie (Treaty).6
The Treaty is a controlling agreement between the Crow Tribe and the
United States.7 Its provisions extend to the Tribe, among other rights, the right to
hunt on “unoccupied lands of the United States.”8 In Herrera v. State of Wyoming,
the Fourth Judicial District Court, Sheridan County, Wyoming, addressed the
validity of the usufructuary Treaty right to hunt on unoccupied lands of the
United States.9 Usufructuary rights do not convey ownership in land, but rather
allow the use of land which is in possession of another.10 Ultimately, the district
court held that prior caselaw abrogated the Treaty right to hunt and that Herrera
1
Herrera v. Wyoming, No. CV 2016-242, at 1, 2 (4th Wyo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 25, 2017), review
denied, No. S-17-0129 (Wyo. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (mem.) (No. 17-532),
vacated, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/17532-opinion-below.pdf.
2

Id. at 2.

3

Id.

Id. at 2–3. Herrera was charged with “Taking an Antlered Big Game Animal Without
a License or During a Closed Season” and “Accessory to Taking an Antlered Big Game Animal
Without a License or During a Closed Season” pursuant to Wyoming Statutes §§ 23-3-102(d) and
23-6-205 (2019).
4

5

See Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 2–5.

6

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 3.

7

Treaty with the Crows, U.S.-Crow, May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649.

8

Id. art. 4.

9

See generally Herrera, No. CV 2016-242.

A United States District Court has described usufructuary rights as follows: “Usufructuary
rights like hunting and fishing imply temporary presence and minimal physical occupation of the
land. A person may pass over another’s land or use the fruits of that land without asserting any
rights to the land. The products taken from the land through hunting, fishing, and harvesting
are renewable and will be available on the land for an infinite time as long as those taking the
products exercise a certain degree of restraint. Therefore, . . . the exercise of usufructuary activities
is not contingent upon actual ownership of land, since the fee owner retains title and can reap the
fruits of his land as well.” Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Exxon Corp., 805 F. Supp. 680, 701 (E.D.
Wis. 1992).
10
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was collaterally estopped from asserting this right.11 Herrera appealed the decision
of the district court to the United States Supreme Court, which granted his
petition for a writ of certiorari and ultimately vacated and remanded the case.12
The district court’s decision in Herrera implicated conflicting Indian, state,
and federal law.13 Among Herrera’s issues were whether Wyoming’s admission into
the Union or the creation of the Bighorn National Forest abrogated the Treaty
hunting right, and whether the Supreme Court has overruled caselaw which held
that the abrogation occurred.14 Additionally, Herrera involved the doctrine of
issue preclusion in relation to the Tribe’s usufructuary Treaty rights.15
This Case Note focuses on the Wyoming district court’s determination that
the Crow Tribe’s hunting rights, as reserved through the Treaty, were abrogated
through Wyoming statehood and the creation of the Bighorn National Forest.16
Despite the decision of the United States Supreme Court to vacate and remand
Herrera, the Wyoming district court provided a logical basis for its decision.17
This Case Note first sets the stage for the Herrera litigation by outlining the
Treaty and precedent dispositive to interpretation of the Treaty.18 Next, it
discusses the district court’s reasoning and argues it correctly applied issue
preclusion.19 Then, this Case Note addresses the district court case on its merits
to demonstrate that, regardless of issue preclusion, Wyoming statehood and the
creation of the Bighorn National Forest abrogated the Treaty hunting right.20
Lastly, this Case Note cautions that, although the conservation necessity doctrine
should apply to Wyoming game regulations, it may be insufficient to protect
Wyoming’s interests in regulating game within the State.21

11

See Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 17.

The Wyoming Supreme Court denied Herrera’s Petition for Writ of Review. For the
Wyoming Supreme Court Order Denying Petition for Writ of Review, see Petition for Writ of
Certiorari app. A at App-1 to -2, Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532), https://www.scotusblog.
com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/17-532-petition.pdf. The United States Supreme Court heard
oral argument on January 8, 2019. See Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (mem); infra note 98 and
accompanying text. The United States Supreme Court vacated the decision of the district court
and remanded the case for further proceedings on May 20, 2019. Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct.
1686 (2019).
12

13

See generally Herrera, No. CV 2016-242.

14

See infra notes 84 –161 and accompanying text.

15

See infra notes 100–46 and accompanying text.

16

See Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 18.

17

See infra notes 162 –69 and accompanying text.

18

See infra notes 28–83 and accompanying text.

19

See infra notes 100 – 46, 174–257 and accompanying text.

20

See infra notes 258–98 and accompanying text.

21

See infra notes 299–320 and accompanying text.
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II. Background
Over three hundred years ago, the Crow Tribe emigrated from Canada
to what is now Southern Montana and Northern Wyoming.22 Hunting had
invariably been a way of life for the Tribe, and this lifestyle continued after
the Tribe’s relocation.23 Increased conflict with non-Indian settlers in the 19th
century led the Tribe to enter into treaties with the United States which affected
the Tribe’s right to hunt.24 These treaties reserved designated land for the Tribe,
and also extended to the Tribe usufructuary rights to hunt.25 The Tribe has
remained in the area and is now federally recognized as a sovereign nation.26
The Tribe has over 14,000 members, with 9,000 residing on the Crow Indian
Reservation in Southern Montana.27

A. The Second Treaty of Fort Laramie
Prior to 1868, the United States identified approximately 38.5 million acres
of land in the present-day states of Wyoming and Montana as Crow territory.28 On
May 7, 1868, the United States and the Tribe entered into a treaty ceding thirty
million acres of the Tribe’s land to the federal government.29 The far-reaching
Treaty includes, among other provisions, a promise of peace, the establishment of
the Crow Reservation, and education for Crow children.30 Article IV of the Treaty
establishes the Tribe’s hunting right.31 It reads:

22
Brief for Petitioner at 4, Herrera v. Wyoming, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (mem) (No. 17-532),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-532/62482/20180904113704523_17-532%
20Herrera%20Opening%20Merits%20Brief.pdf (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.
544, 547– 48 (1981)). The Tribe’s origin is not known with certainty; however, some sources
believe the Tribe emigrated from the east in what is now Ohio. Native Knowledge 360°, https://
americanindian.si.edu/nk360/plains-belonging-homelands/crow-nation.cshtml (last visited Apr. 16,
2019); Montana: Crow Reservation, Partnership with Native Americans, http://www.native
partnership.org/site/PageServer?pagename=PWNA_Native_Reservations_Crow (last visited, Apr.
16, 2009).
23

Brief for Petitioner at 4, Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532).

Id. at 5. In 1851, the Crow Tribe and the United States executed the First Treaty of Fort
Laramie. First Treaty of Fort Laramie with Sioux, etc., Sept. 17, 1851, 11 Stat. 749. In 1868, the
parties executed the Second Treaty of Fort Laramie. See Treaty with the Crows.
24

25

See First Treaty of Fort Laramie, art. 5; Treaty with the Crows, arts. 2, 4.

Brief of the Crow Tribe of Indians as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1, Herrera,
138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532), https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/17532-cert-tsac-crow-tribe.pdf.
26

27

Id.

28

Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis (Repsis II ), 73 F.3d 982, 985 (1995).

Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532), https://www.
supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2018/17-532_c07e.pdf.
29

30

See Treaty with the Crows, arts. 1, 2, 7.

31

Id. art. 4.
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The Indians herein named agree . . . they will make said
reservation their permanent home, and they will make no
permanent settlement elsewhere, but they shall have the right
to hunt on the unoccupied lands of the United States so long as
game may be found thereon, and as long as peace subsists among
the whites and Indians on the borders of the hunting districts.32
After the Tribe and the United States executed the Treaty, Congress admitted
Wyoming into the Union through an enabling act on July 10, 1890.33 Seven years
later, President Grover Cleveland created the Big Horn National Forest Reserve
through a presidential proclamation.34

B. Precedent Implicated in the Treaty’s Interpretation
Interpreting the scope of Indian treaties has been a task of the United States
Supreme Court and other federal and state courts for well over a century.35 Indian
law cases are not uncommon; between 1953 and 2000, the Supreme Court heard
an average of two cases involving Indian matters per year.36 At least one scholar
describes this area of law as “confusing, unpredictable, and prone to obfuscation.”37
The following precedent illustrates the complex nature of treaty interpretation
pertinent to Herrera.38

1. Ward v. Race Horse
Twenty-eight years after the Crow Treaty went into effect, the United States
Supreme Court decided a case involving treaty language identical to that of the
Crow Treaty: Ward v. Race Horse.39 In Race Horse, a member of the Bannock Tribe
of Indians was arrested for violating Wyoming game laws when he killed seven elk
within the state.40 The defendant argued the right to kill the elk was guaranteed to

32

Id. (emphasis added).

An Act to Provide for the Admission of the State of Wyoming into the Union, ch. 664,
§ 1, 26 Stat. 222 (July 10, 1890).
33

34
Pres. Proclamation No. 30, 29 Stat. 909 (Feb. 22, 1897), http://legisworks.org/congress/54/
proc-30.pdf.
35
See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. See also Gloria Valencia-Weber, American Indian Law and
History: Instructional Mirrors, 44 J. Legal Educ. 251, 251–52 (1994).
36
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Indian Problem, 59 Hastings L.J. 579,
579 (2008).
37

Id. at 580.

38

See infra notes 39–83 and accompanying text.

See Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896). See also Treaty with the Crows, art. 4; Treaty
with the Eastern Band Shoshoni and Bannock, art. 4, July 3, 1868, 15 Stat. 673.
39

In re Race Horse, 70 F. 598, 599–600 (C.C.D. Wyo. 1895), rev’d sub. nom. Ward v. Race
Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
40
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him under a treaty between the Bannock Tribe and the United States.41 Identical
to the Crow Treaty language, the Bannock Treaty states that the Bannock Tribe
“shall have the right to hunt on the unoccupied lands of the United States, so
long as game may be found thereon, and so long as peace subsists among the
whites and Indians on the borders of the hunting districts.”42 The Supreme Court
analyzed this language to determine if the treaty rights remained valid.43
Under facts nearly indistinguishable from Herrera, the Supreme Court in
Race Horse determined that the hunting right granted by the Bannock Treaty
was “essentially perishable and intended to be of limited duration.”44 The Court
used the phrase “temporary and precarious” to characterize the treaty hunting
right.45 Through this finding, the Court held Wyoming’s admission into the
Union was inconsistent with the Bannock Tribe’s hunting right, and the right
was extinguished upon Wyoming attaining statehood.46 Because states have the
power to regulate hunting, Justice White, writing for the majority, explained that
validating the treaty’s hunting right would disregard the terms of the Wyoming
Statehood Act, and would therefore contravene the express will of Congress.47
The Race Horse Court ultimately held that the admittance of Wyoming into
the Union abrogated the Bannock Tribe’s hunting right.48 In his dissent, Justice
Brown was critical of the majority’s reasoning that statehood changed land’s
character from that of unoccupied to occupied.49 Instead, Justice Brown stated that

41

Id. at 600.

42

Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 507; Treaty with the Bannock, art. 4; see also Treaty with the Crows,

43

See Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504.

44

Id. at 515.

art. 4.

Id. at 510. “Temporary and precarious” refers to the idea that treaty rights are not
continuous, but rather subject to abrogation upon the occurrence of express conditions contemplated
in the agreement. See id. In the context of the Bannock and Crow Treaties, conditions necessary to
abrogate the hunting right include the “occupation” of land, disruption of peace among the whites
and Indians, and Indian settlement outside of reservation boundaries. See Treaty with the Crows,
art. 4; Treaty with the Bannock, art. 4.
45

46
Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 516. The Race Horse Court based much of its holding on the “equal
footing doctrine.” Id. at 512–13. Under this doctrine, a state must be admitted to the Union on
equal footing with all other states, meaning that all states have the same power to legislate their
own laws, including game laws. See id. at 513 –15. The Wyoming District Court in Herrera
acknowledged that numerous decisions have subsequently rejected the doctrine. Herrera v.
Wyoming, No. CV 2016-242, at 11 (4th Wyo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 25, 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct.
2707 (2018) (mem.) (No. 17-532), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/
wp-content/uploads/2018/01/17-532-opinion-below.pdf. However, the district court found the
“temporary and precarious” doctrine from Race Horse remains “alive and well.” Id.
47

Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 516.

48

See id. at 504.

49

Id. at 520 (Brown, J., dissenting).
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nothing in the Wyoming Statehood Act manifested an intention to repudiate
treaty rights.50

2. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis
More recently, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the same Crow
Treaty hunting right implicated by Herrera in Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis.51
In 1989, Wyoming convicted a Crow Tribe member for hunting and killing an
elk within the Bighorn National Forest without a state-issued hunting license.52
The defendant, together with the Crow Tribe, sought a declaratory judgment
and injunctive relief based on alleged violations of the Treaty.53 The Wyoming
federal district court dismissed the action, finding that Race Horse foreclosed the
Tribe’s off-reservation hunting right.54 On review, the Tenth Circuit held the
Tribe’s argument was indistinguishable from Race Horse, and the “Tribe’s right
to hunt reserved in the [Treaty] was repealed by the act admitting Wyoming into
the Union.”55 The court further held ample evidence in the record supported
the State’s contentions that its regulations were reasonable and necessary for the
conservation of wildlife.56
The Tenth Circuit further laid forth an alternative basis for its decision.57
When the parties executed the Crow Treaty in 1868, lands that are now the
Bighorn National Forest were “unoccupied” because they were open for settlement
in westward expansion.58 However, as the court stated, Congress created the
Bighorn National Forest in 1887 and mandated that the lands be managed and
regulated for specific purposes.59 Therefore, the court found that these lands were
no longer available for settlement, and “the creation of the Big Horn National
Forest resulted in the ‘occupation’ of the land.”60 The court concluded by finding
Race Horse to be “compelling, well-reasoned, and persuasive” and proclaimed

50

Id. at 519–20.

51

Repsis II, 73 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1995).

52

Id. at 985.

53

Id.

54

Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis (Repsis I ), 866 F. Supp. 520, 522–25 (D. Wyo. 1994).

55

Repsis II, 73 F.3d at 992 (citing Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 514).

56

Id. at 993.

57

Id.

58

Id.

Id.; 16 U.S.C. § 475 (2019). The Tenth Circuit stated that an act of Congress created the
Bighorn National Forest in 1887. Repsis II, 73 F.3d at 993. The court was mistaken, however, as the
national forest was created ten years later in 1897 by presidential proclamation and not an act of
Congress. Proclamation No. 30, 29 Stat. 909; About the Bighorn National Forest, U.S. Dep’t Agric.
Forest Serv., https://www.fs.usda.gov/main/bighorn/about-forest (last visited Apr. 21, 2019).
59

60

Repsis II, 73 F.3d at 993.
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that “Race Horse is alive and well.”61 Thus, at the time of the Repsis decision,
courts deemed that the Crow Tribe’s hunting right was abrogated by Wyoming
statehood, and by the transition from “unoccupied” to “occupied” lands at the
creation of the Bighorn National Forest.62

3. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians
The United States Supreme Court called into question the holdings of Race
Horse and Repsis in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians.63 In 1837,
the United States and bands of Chippewa Indians executed a treaty whereby
the Tribe ceded lands in present-day Wisconsin and Minnesota to the federal
government.64 Similar to the Crow Treaty, the treaty in Mille Lacs guaranteed to
the Chippewa Indians certain hunting rights.65 The language of the Chippewa
Treaty, however, differed from the Crow Treaty by providing that “[t]he privilege
of hunting, fishing, and gathering the wild rice, upon the lands, the rivers and
the lakes included in the territory ceded, is guarantied [sic] to the Indians, during
the pleasure of the President of the United States.”66 Congress later admitted
Minnesota into the Union on May 11, 1858.67
Thirty-two years after Minnesota became a state, the Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians sued the State of Minnesota in federal court seeking, among
other relief, a declaratory judgment that the Tribe retained its usufructuary rights
under the 1837 Treaty.68 Both the federal district court and the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals held the Chippewa retained their hunting and fishing rights.69
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, but unlike the Race Horse
and Repsis decisions (which abrogated the Tribes’ treaty rights), the Mille Lacs
Court affirmed that “the Chippewa retain the usufructuary rights guaranteed to
them under the 1837 Treaty.”70 The Court held Minnesota statehood did not by
itself abrogate any Indian usufructuary rights.71 To abrogate Indian treaty rights,
the Court stated Congress must clearly express its intent to do so.72 The Court
61

Id. at 994.

62

See id.

63

Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).

64

Id. at 175.

65

Id. at 176.

66

Treaty with the Chippewa, U.S.-Chippewa, art. V, July 29, 1837, 7 Stat. 536.

An Act for the Admission of the State of Minnesota into the Union, ch. XXXI, 11 Stat. 285
(May 11, 1858).
67

68

Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 185.

69

Id. at 187.

70

Id. at 176.

71

See id. at 202– 03.

72

Id. at 202 (citing United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738– 40 (1986)).
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looked to Minnesota’s Enabling Act and found no clear evidence of congressional
intent to abrogate the Chippewa Treaty rights.73
Understanding that its Mille Lacs holding may conflict with Race Horse,
the Court attempted to reconcile its decisions.74 The majority stated that Race
Horse rested on a “false premise”—namely, that the Crow Treaty rights conflicted
with state regulation of natural resources and therefore were an impairment of
Wyoming’s sovereignty.75 The Mille Lacs Court found that “an Indian tribe’s
treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather on state land are not irreconcilable
with a State’s sovereignty over the natural resources in the State.”76 The Court
held states have authority to impose reasonable and nondiscriminatory regulations
on Indian hunting, and “[t]his ‘conservation necessity’ standard accommodates
both the State’s interest in management of its natural resources and the
Chippewa’s federally guaranteed treaty rights.”77 This statement echoed the
Repsis court, which noted that a state regulation may be upheld if reasonable for
conservation purposes.78
Mille Lacs further held that the “temporary and precarious” language used
in Race Horse was “too broad to be useful as a guide to whether treaty rights
were intended to survive statehood.”79 However, the Court stated the focus of
the Race Horse inquiry as applied to Mille Lacs was whether Congress intended
the rights secured by the Chippewa Treaty to survive statehood.80 The Court also
stated the Crow Treaty contemplated that the rights would continue so long as
the land remained unoccupied and that, by contrast, the Chippewa Treaty “does
not tie the duration of the rights to the occurrence of some clearly contemplated
event.”81 Although Mille Lacs held that statehood cannot by itself abrogate Indian
treaty rights, the Court stated that analyzing congressional intent behind a treaty
should determine if rights were intended to expire upon statehood.82 Mille Lacs
ultimately held that, with regard to the Chippewa Treaty, statehood by itself was
insufficient to extinguish Indian treaty rights on state land.83

73

Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 203.

74

See id. at 203–08.

75

Id. at 204.

Id. (citing Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658
(1979)) (emphasis added).
76

77

Id. at 205.

78

See supra note 56 and accompanying text.

79

Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 206 –07.

80

Id. at 207.

81

Id.

82

See id.

83

Id.
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III. Wyoming State District Court Opinion
A. Procedural Posture
After his arrest, Herrera moved to dismiss his game violation charges in the
Fourth Judicial Circuit Court, Sheridan County, Wyoming.84 He asserted the
Crow Treaty reserved to the Tribe the right to hunt on “unoccupied lands of
the United States.”85 The State of Wyoming asked the circuit court to prohibit
Herrera from making reference to the Treaty at trial, so long as the court
concluded that the Treaty rights were no longer valid and provided no
defense to Herrera.86 The circuit court held the Treaty hunting right issue was
indistinguishable from Repsis, and the court was bound by the precedent that
Crow Tribe members do not have off-reservation hunting rights anywhere within
Wyoming.87 The circuit court further held that Mille Lacs did not overturn Repsis
or Race Horse.88 Instead, the court agreed with the Repsis court’s decision that
the intent of the Treaty hunting right was temporary and no longer exists.89 The
circuit court alternatively held that, even if Treaty rights existed, the Wyoming
game laws at issue met the conservation necessity standard, and therefore applied
to all Crow Treaty hunters.90
After the Wyoming Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court
denied Herrera’s request for a stay of his trial, proceedings commenced, and a jury

Herrera v. Wyoming, No. CV 2016-242, at 3 (4th Wyo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 25, 2017), cert.
granted, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (mem.) (No. 17-532), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019), https://
www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/17-532-opinion-below.pdf. Wyoming state
courts are organized differently than the federal system. Compare About the Courts, Wyo. Jud.
Branch, https://www.courts.state.wy.us/about-the-courts/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2019), with Offices
of the States Attorneys, U.S. Dep’t of Just., https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/federal-courts
(last visited Apr. 17, 2019). In Wyoming, criminal jurisdiction for all misdemeanors is vested in the
circuit courts. Wyo. Jud. Branch, supra. The district courts have jurisdiction over felony criminal
matters and also hear appeals from circuit court decisions. Id.
84

85

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 3; Treaty with the Crows, art. 4.

86

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 3.

Id. at 4. The district court noted that the circuit court was not, in fact, bound by the Tenth
Circuit decision in Repsis II, but that the circuit court was free to adopt the Repsis II holding. Id. at
17–18.
87

88

Id. at 4.

Id.; see also Wyoming v. Herrera, Nos. CT-2015-2687, CT-2015-2688 (4th Wyo. Circ.
Ct. 16, 2015), cert. granted sub. nom. Herrera v. Wyoming, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (mem.) (No.
17-532), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019), available at Petition for Writ of Certiorari apps. C & D
at App-36, App-38 to -39, Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532), https://www.scotusblog.com/
wp-content/uploads/2018/01/17-532-petition.pdf.
89

90

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 4.; see also infra note 156 and accompanying text.
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convicted Herrera on both misdemeanor charges.91 Herrera then appealed to the
Fourth Judicial District Court, Sheridan County, Wyoming.92 The district court
affirmed Herrera’s criminal conviction on April 25, 2017.93
Following the district court’s holding, Herrera attempted to appeal the
decision to the Wyoming Supreme Court.94 On June 6, 2017, the Wyoming
Supreme Court entered an order denying Herrera’s petition for review.95 Herrera
then appealed from the district court to the United States Supreme Court on
October 5 of the same year.96 The Court called for the views of the Solicitor
General, who advised that, from the perspective of the United States, neither
Wyoming’s admission to the Union nor the creation of the Bighorn National
Forest abrogated the Crow Tribe’s hunting right under the Treaty.97 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari on June 28, 2018, heard oral arguments on January 8,
2019, and ultimately vacated and remanded the decision of the district court
on May 20, 2019.98 This Case Note addresses the Wyoming district court’s
determination regarding the Treaty’s abrogation.99

B. Issue Preclusion
On appeal from the circuit court, the primary concern of the Wyoming
district court was Herrera’s ability to litigate the Treaty right because the issue
may have been previously decided in Race Horse and Repsis.100 The potential for

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 4–5. The circuit court imposed upon Herrera concurrent
sentences of one year in jail suspended in lieu of unsupervised probation, three years of suspended
hunting privileges, and $8,080 in fines and court costs. Id. at 5.
91

92

Id.

93

See id.

94

Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. A at App-1, Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532).

Id. The Wyoming Supreme Court did not provide any reason for its decision to deny
Herrera’s petition for review. See id.
95

96

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532).

Brief for Petitioner at 17, Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532); Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae at 8, 12, Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532), https://www.supremecourt.gov/
DocketPDF/17/17-532/47755/20180522153509400_17-532%20Herrera.pdf. The United States
essentially adopts Herrera’s arguments by stating, inter alia: (1) Wyoming statehood did not abrogate
the Treaty hunting right because the Treaty does not specify statehood as a circumstance under
which the right would terminate; (2) Establishment of the Bighorn National Forest did itself not
render lands within the Forest “occupied”; and (3) Herrera should not be precluded from litigating
the Treaty hunting right because the Mille Lacs decision constitutes an intervening change in the
applicable legal context. Id. at 8–9, 20–21.
97

See Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532); Herrera v. Wyoming, SCOTUSblog, http://
www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/herrera-v-wyoming/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
98

99
100

See infra notes 162–320 and accompanying text.
Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 5.
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issue preclusion prompted the district court to request sua sponte briefing from
the parties on the matter.101 Issue preclusion, also termed collateral estoppel, “bars
relitigation of previously litigated issues.”102 Wyoming caselaw sets forth four
prerequisites for issue preclusion to apply:
(1) whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication was
identical with the issue presented in the present action;
(2) whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the
merits; (3) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel
is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication; and (4) whether the party against whom collateral
estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
issue in the prior proceeding.103
The district court considered whether these prerequisites applied to the case at
hand, which would prevent Herrera from relitigating the Treaty hunting right.104
As to the first prerequisite, the State argued the primary issue in Repsis (the
validity of the Treaty hunting right) was identical to the issue in Herrera.105
Herrera disagreed, and argued the Repsis court did not analyze two subsequent
congressionally-ratified agreements.106 The district court concluded the court
in Repsis was aware of these agreements, and therefore the issue Herrera was
attempting to litigate was indistinguishable from Repsis.107 The court found the
first prerequisite for the application of issue preclusion was satisfied.108
To satisfy the second prerequisite, a prior adjudication in an issue preclusion
matter must have resulted in a judgment on the merits.109 To address this element,
the district court cited federal caselaw when it stated “[a]djudication on the merits

101

Id.

Tozzi v. Moffett, 2018 WY 133, ¶ 16, 430 P.3d 754, 760 (Wyo. 2018) (citing Slavens v.
Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs for Uinta Cty., 854 P.2d 683, 686 (Wyo. 1993) (internal citations omitted)).
102

103
Polo Ranch Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 WY 15, ¶ 12, 61 P.3d 1255, 1259 (Wyo. 2003);
Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 6. Federal Courts also apply the same four prerequisites. See, e.g.,
Murdock v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 975 F.2d 683, 687 (10th Cir. 1992);
Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 6.
104

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 7.

105

Id.

Id. The district court does not state which subsequently-ratified agreements Herrera refers
to, but this information is not relevant considering that the court finds the Repsis court was aware of
them. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
106

107

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 7.

108

Id.

109

See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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requires that the adjudication be necessary to the judgment.”110 Repsis held that
the parties to the Treaty hunting right intended it to be temporary in nature and
the right was no longer valid.111 Because the validity of the hunting right was
necessary to the Repsis judgment, the court found that a judgment on the merits
occurred, and thus the second prerequisite was also satisfied.112
The third prerequisite demands that the party against whom issue preclusion
is asserted was a party, or is in privity with a party, in the prior action.113 Privity
exists if the party in the present case “was adequately represented by someone
with the same interests who [was] a party to the [prior] suit.”114 Herrera was not
a party to the Repsis adjudication.115 However, the court found that the Crow
Tribe had an equal or greater interest in hunting rights as Herrera, the Tribe was
represented by competent legal counsel, the Tribe wanted the right declared valid
for all its members, and Herrera’s presence in the Repsis litigation would not have
been necessary to the proceeding.116 Additionally, the court found that Herrera
only possessed a right to hunt if the Tribe possessed that right.117 In making the
above findings, the court determined that Herrera was in privity with the Tribe,
which was a party in Repsis.118 The district court, therefore, found that the third
prerequisite was satisfied.119
The fourth and final prerequisite to issue preclusion necessitates that the
party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior
adjudication.120 The district court stated that a full and fair opportunity to litigate
“focuses on whether there were significant procedural limitations in the prior
proceeding, whether the party to the prior action had the incentive to litigate
the issue fully, and whether effective litigation was limited by the nature or
relationship of the parties.”121 Although Herrera did not take part in the Repsis

110
Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 7 (citing Murdock v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray
Reservation, 975 F.2d 683, 687 (10th Cir. 1992)).
111

See Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 7.

112

Id. at 7–8.

113

See supra note 103 and accompanying text.

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 8 (citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 (2008)
(internal citations omitted)).
114

115

Id.

116

See id. at 8–9.

117

See id. at 9.

118

Id.

119

Id.

120

See supra note 103 and accompanying text.

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 9 (citing Murdock v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray
Reservation, 975 F.2d 683, 687 (10th Cir. 1992)).
121

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2019

13

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 19 [2019], No. 2, Art. 9

284

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 19

litigation, the Crow Tribe, in privity with Herrera, did participate.122 Because
the Tribe had incentive to litigate the Repsis issue fully, and further appealed
the decision, the district court found that the Tribe had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.123 Thus, the court deemed that the
final prerequisite was satisfied.124
The court further examined whether the use of offensive issue preclusion
in a criminal case was permissible.125 The use of issue preclusion in this context
is rare, as the district court noted.126 The court found the applicability of issue
preclusion turned on whether it would preclude a defendant from contesting a
substantive element of the charged offense.127 A deprival of due process may arise
when a criminal defendant is denied an opportunity to contest elements of the
charged crime.128 The court reasoned that precluding Herrera from litigating his
Treaty right did not prevent him from contesting any essential element of his
criminal charges.129 Because the State was still required to prove every element
of the game violations, and the Treaty’s validity did not present facts for a jury
to determine, the court held that Herrera’s right to due process was not
violated.130 The district court in Herrera concluded that issue preclusion was a
legal ground appearing in the record, and it affirmed the circuit court’s conviction
on this basis.131

122

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 10.

123

See id.

124

Id.

125

Id. at 14.

Id. Issue preclusion is most often applied in civil cases. Id. The Wyoming Supreme Court
has not addressed the issue of offensive issue preclusion in a criminal case, but it has applied the
doctrine in a civil action to an issue litigated in a criminal action. Id. (citing Bowen v. Wyoming,
2011 WY 1, ¶¶ 11–12, 245 P.3d 827, 830–31 (Wyo. 2011)). The Herrera court stated that federal
courts are split as to whether offensive issue preclusion in a criminal case violates due process.
Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 14 (comparing United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240,
1244 (10th Cir. 1998), with Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20, 21–22 (8th Cir.
1975), and United States v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F. 2d 81, 83–84 (9th Cir. 1980)).
126

127

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 14–15.

128

See id. at 16.

Id. at 16. The essential elements of Herrera’s criminal charges are wholly unrelated to the
issue of the Treaty’s validity. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 23-3-102(d), 23-6-205.
129

130
Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 16. The district court reinforced its use of issue preclusion
in the criminal context by citing to Moses v. Department of Corrections, where the Michigan Court
of Appeals held that a previous decision, which held that a swampland where a crime had been
committed was not part of the defendant’s Indian reservation, precluded the defendant from
challenging the court’s jurisdiction in his criminal case. See id. at 15–16; Moses v. Dep’t of Corr.,
736 N.W.2d 269, 282– 83 (Mich. App. 2007).
131

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 16.
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C. Exceptions to the Issue Preclusion Doctrine
If issue preclusion applied to Herrera’s case, he argued that an exception
to the doctrine should also apply.132 In district court, Herrera argued that the
Mille Lacs decision, handed down after Repsis, was an “intervening change in
the applicable legal context” and thus the issue of Treaty hunting rights required
a new determination.133 The State countered that Mille Lacs did not overturn
Race Horse or Repsis, and therefore the exception was inapplicable and required no
new determination.134
The district court began its inquiry by summarizing the precedent set forth
in Race Horse and Repsis.135 The court noted that the “temporary and precarious”
language used in Race Horse and Repsis to describe the Treaty hunting right
remained “alive and well.”136 Importantly, the court distinguished Mille Lacs
from Race Horse and Repsis.137 It stated that although Mille Lacs criticized the
“temporary and precarious” language as being too broad to be useful, Mille Lacs
did not completely reject this language.138 Instead, the Mille Lacs Court attempted
to apply the Race Horse inquiry to the Chippewa Treaty by stating “[t]he focus of
the Race Horse inquiry is whether Congress . . . intended the rights secured by the
[Chippewa Treaty] to survive statehood.”139 The Mille Lacs majority proceeded
by explaining that the Crow Treaty hunting right in Race Horse extinguished
upon a “clearly contemplated event”: “the rights would continue only so long as
the hunting grounds remained unoccupied and owned by the United States.”140
Conversely, the Chippewa Treaty in Mille Lacs had no such condition, and did
not associate the duration of the rights with the occurrence of some “clearly
contemplated event.”141

132

Id. at 11.

Id. at 10–11. The court used the following excerpt from the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments: “Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment,
and the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action
between the parties is not precluded in the following circumstances: . . . (2) . . . a new determination
is warranted in order to take account of an intervening change in the applicable legal context
or otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the laws . . . .” Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 28 (1982).
133

134

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 11.

135

Id. at 11–12.

136

Id. at 11.

137

See id. at 12.

138

Id.

139

Id. (citing Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 207 (1999)).

140

Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 207.

141

Id.
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The district court used this distinction to conclude that the Crow Treaty
was intended to terminate upon certain conditions and therefore differed from
the Chippewa Treaty, where no such “clearly contemplated event” existed.142 The
district court rejected Herrera’s argument that Mille Lacs overturned Race Horse
or Repsis.143 Instead, the district court found Mille Lacs affirmed the principle
that “a court interpreting a treaty must determine if the rights reserved in the
treaty were intended to be perpetual or if they were intended to expire upon the
happening of a ‘clearly contemplated event.’”144 Based on this finding, the district
court determined that Mille Lacs did not constitute an intervening change in the
applicable legal context.145 Absent such a change, the court held that Herrera was
unable to successfully assert this issue preclusion exception.146

D. Alternative Decision on the Merits
In the event that issue preclusion did not apply, the district court provided
an alternative basis for affirming the circuit court’s conviction.147 The court
recognized the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which
provides that a federal treaty is binding on the states until Congress abrogates it.148
The court likened treaties to contracts, where the intent of the parties is essential
to interpretation.149 However, unlike contracts where courts do not consider
extrinsic evidence in construing the contract, courts employ certain methods of
interpretation to determine the intent of Indian treaties.150 Specifically, a court
should consider “the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical
construction adopted by the parties” when determining the purpose and scope of
an Indian treaty.151 The Supreme Court in Race Horse applied these interpretive
methods to find the Treaty right was temporary in nature, and was not intended
to survive Wyoming Statehood.152 The Herrera district court agreed.153

142

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 13.

143

Id.

144

Id.

145

See id. at 13–14.

146

Id.

147

See id. at 16–18.

See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 16–17 (citing Antoine v.
Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 201–02 (1975)).
148

149

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 17.

150

Id.

151

Id. (citing Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1943)).

See id.; supra notes 39–50 and accompanying text. For example, the Race Horse Court
considered the Treaty’s history when explaining that, at the time the agreement was executed, “the
march of advancing civilization foreshadowed the fact that the wilderness . . . was destined to be
occupied. . . .” Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 508–09 (1896).
152

153

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 17–18.
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The district court also set forth several reasons for following the holding in
Repsis.154 First, the Repsis decision considered the same interpretive methods as
Race Horse when it held the Crow Treaty hunting right was abrogated by the
Wyoming Statehood Act.155 The court noted Repsis also determined that, because
statehood abrogated the Treaty hunting right, Crow members were subject to
Wyoming game laws regardless of whether the laws were reasonable and necessary
for conservation.156 Lastly, the court recited the Repsis court’s alternate holding
that the creation of the Bighorn National Forest rendered the lands within the
hunting district “occupied.”157 Satisfied that both Race Horse and Repsis properly
utilized treaty interpretation, the district court held that it was appropriate for the
circuit court to adopt these prior federal decisions.158
The district court concluded by reiterating that Mille Lacs did not overrule
Repsis.159 Rather, the court stated “Mille Lacs reaffirmed the principle that the
court must look at the language in the treaty to determine whether it was intended
to be perpetual or if it was intended to terminate at the occurrence of a ‘clearly
contemplated’ event.”160 Because Repsis applied this principle, and its decision was
based on what the district court deemed a still-valid holding in Race Horse, the
court concluded it was proper for the circuit court to bar Herrera from asserting
his Treaty right at trial.161

IV. Analysis
A good argument exists that the district court correctly recognized the prior
abrogation of the Crow Treaty hunting right.162 For this reason, the doctrine of
issue preclusion properly applied to Herrera. Contrary to Herrera’s contentions,
prior courts adjudicated the exact issue that Herrera presented to the district
court.163 To respect the finality of judgments, the district court correctly pro
hibited Herrera from relitigating the previously-decided Treaty hunting right.164
Issue preclusion, however, is not the sole proper basis for the district court’s
affirmance of Herrera’s conviction. The merits of the case also compel the
154

See id.

155

See id. at 17; infra notes 270–71 and accompanying text.

156

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 17.

157

Id.

158

Id. at 18.

159

Id.

160

Id.

161

See id.

162

See infra notes 174–320 and accompanying text.

163

See infra notes 174–209 and accompanying text.

164

See infra notes 174–209 and accompanying text.
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conclusion of the Treaty hunting right’s abrogation.165 The Tenth Circuit deemed
the tribal right to hunt invalid in Repsis, which based its holding on the decision
in Race Horse.166 Mille Lacs did not explicitly overrule the decisions of Race Horse
or Repsis.167 Rather, Mille Lacs distinguished itself from Race Horse and Repsis.168
Therefore, the Treaty hunting right was “temporary and precarious” and both
Wyoming statehood and the creation of the Bighorn National Forest abrogated
this right by having the effect of “occupying” the land.169 Despite the Supreme
Court’s ultimate determination of the case, the Wyoming district court adequately
supported the proper outcome of Herrera.
Furthermore, the final outcome of Herrera has significant implications for
Wyoming’s right to regulate hunting on public lands.170 Because abrogation of the
Treaty right ensures that Wyoming may regulate all hunting (tribal or otherwise)
within the state, regulation serves an important function for Wyoming to protect
its related interests.171 However, if the Treaty rights are valid, Wyoming may be
limited in its authority to protect hunting interests.172 The conservation necessity
doctrine may not adequately protect these interests, and because the Supreme
Court’s final holding in Herrera declined to address the doctrine, states’ ability to
regulate hunting is still unsettled.173

A. Issue Preclusion was Properly Applied to Herrera
Procedurally, the doctrine of issue preclusion works to avoid the adjudication
of duplicative issues in separate actions.174 The law prefers that courts generate
consistent outcomes when cases involve identical facts or issues.175 When a legal
action attempts to reintroduce an issue that has been decided in a previous case,
issue preclusion intervenes to preclude relitigation of that issue and bind parties to

165

See infra notes 258–98 and accompanying text.

166

Repsis II, 73 F.3d 982, 992–93 (10th Cir. 1995).

167

See generally Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).

168

Id.

169

See infra notes 174–298 and accompanying text.

170

See infra notes 299–320 and accompanying text.

171

See infra notes 299–320 and accompanying text.

172

See infra notes 299–320 and accompanying text.

173

See infra notes 299–320 and accompanying text.

See Michelle S. Simon, Offensive Issue Preclusion in the Criminal Context: Two Steps Forward,
One Step Back, 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 753, 754 (2004); see also supra note 102 and accompanying text.
174

See Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecution Use of Estoppel and Related Doctrine in Criminal Cases:
Promoting Consistency, Tolerating Inconsistency, 64 Rutgers L. Rev. 409, 409–10 (2012).
175
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the original result.176 The Wyoming district court properly determined that issue
preclusion applied in Herrera.177

1. Prerequisites to Issue Preclusion are Satisfied
The district court correctly held that the four prerequisites to issue
preclusion were met.178 First, the court found that the issue decided in Repsis was
identical to the issue presented by Herrera.179 The issue in Repsis was whether
Race Horse foreclosed the Crow Tribe’s right to hunt on unoccupied lands.180 The
Repsis court held the “Tribe’s right to hunt . . . was repealed by the act admitting
Wyoming into the Union.”181 Herrera attempted to litigate the validity of the offreservation Treaty hunting right.182 Herrera acknowledged that Repsis ruled on the
continued validity of the hunting right in the Crow Treaty.183 His only argument,
that two agreements congressionally-ratified after Repsis were not considered by
the Repsis court, is not persuasive.184 As the district court noted, the agreements
originated in 1891 and 1904, prior to the Repsis decision.185 Therefore, the
agreements were available for the Repsis court’s review at the time the case was
decided. Even if the court did not consider the agreements, the ultimate issue of
the Treaty’s validity is identical to Repsis.186
Second, the district court properly held that the prior adjudication resulted
in a judgment on the merits.187 In Repsis, the federal district court found that
the Treaty right was intended to be temporary in nature, and the Tenth Circuit
affirmed this determination.188 Because the validity of the Treaty right was
necessary to that judgment, a judgment on the merits occurred.189 Therefore,
the test that “[a]djudication on the merits requires that the adjudication be

176

Simon, supra note 174, at 754.

See Herrera v. Wyoming, No. CV 2016-242, at 18 (4th Wyo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 25, 2017), cert.
granted, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (mem.) (No. 17-532), https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/
uploads/2018/01/17-532-opinion-below.pdf; see also infra notes 179–209 and accompanying text.
177

178

See Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 7–10.

179

See supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text.

180

Repsis II, 73 F.3d 982, 986 (10th Cir. 1995).

181

Id. at 992 (citing Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 514 (1896)).

182

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 5.

183

Id. at 7.

184

Id.

185

Id.

186

Repsis II, 73 F.3d at 986.

187

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 7.

188

Id. at 7– 8; see also Repsis II, 73 F.3d 982.

189

See supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2019

19

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 19 [2019], No. 2, Art. 9

290

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 19

necessary to the judgment” is satisfied, which in turn satisfies the second issue
preclusion prerequisite.190
With regard to the third prerequisite to issue preclusion, the district court
correctly determined that Herrera was in privity with the Crow Tribe, which was
a party to the Repsis decision.191 Privity “signifies that the relationship between
two persons is such that a judgment involving one of them is conclusive upon the
other, although the other was not a party to the suit.”192 The district court found
that privity exists if the party in the present case “was adequately represented
by someone with the same interests who [was] a party to the [prior] suit.”193
The Crow Tribe attempted to validate the Treaty hunting right for all members
through its suit in Repsis.194 Thus, the Tribe advocated for all of its members,
including Herrera.195 The Tribe was capable of making compelling arguments,
as it was represented by competent legal counsel.196 Herrera’s presence was
not necessary to the proceedings because the Tribe was already advocating on
his behalf.197 These factors support the finding that the Crow Tribe adequately
represented Herrera’s interests in Repsis.198 The district court therefore properly
held that Herrera was in privity with the Crow Tribe, which satisfies the third
issue preclusion prerequisite.199
Lastly, the district court properly determined that the Crow Tribe, with
whom Herrera is in privity, had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue
in Repsis.200 The trial court decided Repsis on summary judgment.201 However,
because the Tribe had an opportunity to produce evidence on the issue, deciding
the case on summary judgment was not a procedural limitation.202 The Crow
Tribe had the incentive to fully litigate the issue in Repsis to validate hunting

Murdock v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 975 F.2d 683, 687 (10th
Cir. 1992); Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 7.
190

191

See supra notes 113–19 and accompanying text.

Casiano v. State, 2019 WY 16, ¶ 15, 434 P.3d 116, 121 (Wyo. 2019) (citing Grynberg v.
L&R Exploration Venture, 2011 WY 134, ¶ 23, 261 P.3d 731, 737 (Wyo. 2011)).
192

193
Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 8 (citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 (2008))
(internal citations omitted).
194
195

See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.

196

See supra note 116 and accompanying text.

197

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 8–9.

198

See supra notes 191–97 and accompanying text.

199

See supra notes 191–97 and accompanying text.

200

See supra notes 120–24 and accompanying text.

201

See Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis (Repsis I ), 866 F. Supp. 520 (D. Wyo. 1994).

202

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 10.
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rights for all of its members, including Herrera.203 Further, the relationship of the
parties in Repsis did not limit effective litigation.204 Nowhere in Repsis does the
Tenth Circuit point to any reasons why the relationship of the parties would limit
effective litigation.205 The district court also used federal caselaw to hold that an
opportunity to appeal the prior decision constituted a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the issue.206 In Repsis, the Crow Tribe appealed the Wyoming federal
court’s decision to the Tenth Circuit.207 When the case was affirmed on appeal,
the Tribe also sought a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.208
The Tribe’s appeal to both the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court constitutes
a fair opportunity to litigate the issue, satisfying the fourth and final prerequisite
for issue preclusion.209

2. Offensive Issue Preclusion in a Criminal Case is Proper in this Context
The district court’s application of offensive issue preclusion to the criminal
context in Herrera was appropriate.210 Courts use offensive issue preclusion to
“estop a defendant from relitigating the issues which the defendant previously
litigated and lost against another plaintiff.”211 In the present case, Herrera was
attempting to litigate an issue—the validity of the Treaty hunting right—that
the Crow Tribe, whom Herrera was in privity with, previously litigated and
lost.212 The United States Supreme Court grants broad discretion to courts in
determining when offensive issue preclusion should apply.213 However, the Court
has not addressed whether this discretion extends to the criminal context.214 In
the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court, lower federal circuits are split
on whether offensive issue preclusion is appropriate in the criminal context.215

203

Id.

204

Id.

205

See generally Repsis II, 73 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1995).

206

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 10.

207

Id.

Id. The United States Supreme Court denied the Tribe’s petition for writ of certiorari. Repsis
III, 116 S. Ct. 1851 (1996) (mem.).
208

209

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 10.

210

Id. at 14–16.

211

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329 (1979).

212

See generally Herrera, No. CV 2016-242.

213

Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 331.

214

Simon, supra note 174, at 756.

Id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 897 (3d Cir. 1993) (refusing to
allow offensive issue preclusion in the criminal context); Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515
F.2d 20, 21–22 (8th Cir. 1975) (allowing offensive issue preclusion in the criminal context); United
215
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And, as the district court noted, the Wyoming Supreme Court has not addressed
the matter, either.216 Some courts allow the use of issue preclusion when it “affects
a judge’s pretrial ruling and does not necessarily eliminate a jury’s consideration
of substantive elements of the indicted offense.”217 Consideration by a jury is
necessary to satisfy a criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to due process.218
The district court correctly exercised this reasoning to find the State was still
required to prove every element of the game violations at trial, and therefore
application of issue preclusion did not violate Herrera’s due process rights.219
Convincingly, the district court also cited to caselaw applying issue preclusion
in a criminal case when the issue was previously adjudicated in a civil case.220 In
Moses v. Department of Corrections, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that a
previous decision precluded a defendant from challenging the court’s jurisdiction
in his criminal case.221 Similar to the present case, the defendant in Moses was not
a party to the prior adjudication, but rather was claiming “rights as a member of
the Indian tribe that was a party.”222 The privity prerequisite for issue preclusion
applies in both Moses and Herrera.223 The Michigan Court of Appeals held that
the use of issue preclusion did not prevent the defendant from contesting an
essential element of the criminal charge.224 The similarities between Herrera and
Moses illustrate that the Wyoming district court was not the first court to use the
principles it applied, and the court identified persuasive authority that legitimized
its reasoning.225
The doctrine of issue preclusion as applied in Moses and Herrera “promotes
the efficient administration of justice and ensures more consistent judicial
decisions.”226 It also accords finality to the prior adjudication.227 Although “wise
States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir. 1998) (refusing to allow offensive issue
preclusion in the criminal context); United States v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1980)
(allowing offensive issue preclusion in the criminal context).
216

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 14; see also supra note 126 and accompanying text.

217

State v. Hewins, 760 S.E.2d 814, 823 (2014).

Simon, supra note 174, at 779– 80. “Under the Due Process Clause, a criminal defendant
has the right to a determination by a jury of whether the prosecution has proved every element of
the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 779.
218

219

See Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 16; see also supra note 130 and accompanying text.

220

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 15.

See id. at 15–16; Moses v. Dep’t of Corr., 736 N.W.2d 269 (Mich. App. 2007); see also
supra note 130.
221

222

Moses, 736 N.W.2d at 283.

223

Compare id., with Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 8–9.

224

Moses, 736 N.W.2d at 283 (citing People v. Goss, 521 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Mich. 1994)).

225

See supra notes 125–31 and accompanying text.

226

Moses, 736 N.W.2d at 283.

227

See id.
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public policy and judicial efficiency . . . do not have the same weight and value
in criminal cases” as they do in civil cases, both the Michigan court and the
Wyoming district court gave weight to these concepts of judgment finality.228
Because the law prefers that courts generate consistent rulings and outcomes, the
issue preclusion principles identified by the district court were properly applied
and should be adhered to in the criminal context.229

3. No “Intervening Change in the Applicable Legal Context” Exists
The law of issue preclusion derives primarily from common law, and several
exceptions apply to the doctrine.230 One of these exceptions occurs when an
“intervening change in the applicable legal context” makes new determination
of an issue necessary.231 In perhaps his strongest argument, Herrera contends that
the United States Supreme Court altered the applicable legal context through its
Mille Lacs decision.232 The Wyoming circuit court’s decision (which the district
court affirmed) rested primarily on Repsis, which borrowed legal reasoning from
Race Horse.233 The courts decided these cases in 1995 and 1896, respectively.234
The Supreme Court decided Mille Lacs more recently, in 1999.235 Because
Mille Lacs was decided after Race Horse and Repsis, Herrera argued that the
applicable legal context changed, which warranted the application of the issue
preclusion exception.236
The district court properly found that the exception did not apply to
Herrera.237 The treaty language in Race Horse is identical to the treaty language
in Repsis and Herrera.238 Both the Bannock Treaty in Race Horse and the Crow
Treaty in Repsis and Herrera state that the Tribes “shall have the right to hunt on
the unoccupied lands of the United States, so long as game may be found thereon,
and so long as peace subsists among the whites and Indians on the borders of the

United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal
quotations omitted). Compare Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 15–16, with Moses, 736 N.W. 2d
at 283.
228

229

See Poulin, supra note 175, at 409.

230

See Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 10.

231

See id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgements § 28).

232

See id. at 11.

See generally id.; Repsis II, 73 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1995); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S.
504 (1896).
233

234

Repsis II, 73 F.3d 982; Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504.

235

Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).

236

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 13.

237

See id. at 10 –14.

238

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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hunting districts.”239 Conversely, the Mille Lacs treaty states that “[t]he privilege
of hunting, fishing, and gathering the wild rice, upon the lands, the rivers and
the lakes included in the territory ceded, is guarantied [sic] to the Indians, during
the pleasure of the President of the United States.”240 Due to this differing
treaty language, the district court properly distinguished Mille Lacs from Race
Horse and Repsis.241
In Race Horse, the Supreme Court found the treaty language was “temporary
and precarious.”242 Because the treaty language was identical in Repsis and Race
Horse, the Repsis court followed Race Horse and again held the treaty language to
be “temporary and precarious.”243 In Mille Lacs, the Court held that the treaty
language “does not tie the duration of the rights to the occurrence of some clearly
contemplated event.”244 Because the treaty language differed in Mille Lacs and did
not extinguish upon a clearly contemplated event, the district court properly held
that Mille Lacs did not constitute a change in the applicable legal context and did
not require a new determination.245
Bolstering the district court’s reasoning, the Mille Lacs decision never expressly
overruled Race Horse.246 To the contrary, the Supreme Court in Mille Lacs took
great care in its attempt to reconcile the differences between Race Horse and Mille
Lacs.247 The Court explained that the focus of the Race Horse inquiry was whether
Congress intended treaty rights to survive statehood.248 The Race Horse Court
determined that, because of the Crow Treaty language, Congress did not intend the
hunting right to survive statehood.249 The opposite was true in Mille Lacs, where
the Court ultimately determined that Congress did intend the Chippewa Treaty to
survive statehood.250 This distinction did not change the applicable legal context,
but rather illustrated two different outcomes using the same legal reasoning:
determining congressional intent at the time of the treaties’ execution.251 If the
treaties in Race Horse and Mille Lacs were identical, this difference in outcomes

239

Treaty with the Crows, art. 4; Treaty with the Bannock, art. 4.

240

Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 177.

241

See supra note 142 and accompanying text.

242

Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 510 (1896).

243

Repsis II, 73 F.3d 982, 988 (10th Cir. 1995).

244

Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 207.

245

See supra note 145 and accompanying text.

246

See generally Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172.

247

See id. at 206– 07.

248

Id. at 207.

249

Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 514–16 (1896).

250

Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 205.

251

See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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could not stand. However, because the language between the treaties differs,
inconsistent outcomes may be expected if congressional intent differs. Because
the Crow Treaty was conditioned on the occurrence of a clearly contemplated
event and the Chippewa Treaty was not, the act of statehood abrogated one treaty
but not the other. The district court in Herrera recognized this distinction and
held that Mille Lacs did not overturn Race Horse or Repsis, but rather “it affirmed
the concept that a court interpreting a treaty must determine if the rights reserved
in the treaty were intended to be perpetual or if they were intended to expire
on the happening of a ‘clearly contemplated event.’”252 Distinguishing Mille Lacs
from Race Horse and Repsis in this manner was proper.
At oral argument, Justice Kagan spoke on the portion of Mille Lacs that
distinguished Race Horse.253 She illustrated the difficulty in parsing out the
Mille Lacs Court’s intentions by stating, “I’ve read that paragraph three times,
and I still really have no idea what it’s talking about.”254 Although the Mille Lacs
Court left much to be determined by courts today with respect to its distinction
of Race Horse, the Supreme Court should have determined that applicable legal
context such as to necessitate a new determination of the Crow Treaty hunting
right. If the Court intended to overrule Race Horse in Mille Lacs, it could have
expressly done so.255 Instead, the majority opted to carve out a section of its
decision distinguishing Mille Lacs from Race Horse.256 This demonstrates that
the Court avoided addressing the legal reasoning of Race Horse, which does not
disrupt the Repsis decision, and therefore does not warrant a new determination
of the Crow Treaty rights. Wyoming, therefore, should retain the authority to
interpret, as Justice Gorsuch stated during oral argument, its “excellent Wyoming
law of issue preclusion.”257

252
Herrera v. Wyoming, No. CV 2016-242, at 13 (4th Wyo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 25, 2017), cert.
granted, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (mem.) (No. 17-532), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019), https://
www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/17-532-opinion-below.pdf.

Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Herrera v. Wyoming, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (mem.) (No.
17-532), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2018/17-532_c07e.pdf.
253

254

Id.

The Supreme Court has stated: “If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a
case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, [lower courts] should
follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions.” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). Because
Race Horse has direct application to Herrera, the district court was correct to follow Race Horse even
if its decision appears to rest on reasons potentially rejected in Mille Lacs. See id. The district court
properly left to the Supreme Court the prerogative of overruling its own precedent in Race Horse.
See id.
255

256

Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 206– 07 (1999).

257

Transcript of Oral argument at 13, Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532).
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B. The Merits of Herrera Support the District Court’s Holding
Although issue preclusion was at the core of the district court’s opinion,
the court provided alternative reasons for affirmance.258 Among them, the court
utilized the Indian canon of construction, historical implications, the meaning of
“occupied” lands, and discussed states’ abilities to regulate game for conservation
purposes.259 These considerations addressed the validity of the Treaty hunting
right on its merits.260

1. The Indian Canon of Construction and Other Interpretive Methods
Support Affirmance
The basic tenet of the Indian canon of construction, as Justice John Marshall
described in 1832, is that “[t]he language used in treaties with the Indians should
never be construed to their prejudice.”261 Since Justice Marshall first set forth the
Indian canon of construction, this framework for interpreting Indian treaties has
become a fundamental principle of Indian law.262
Recognizing that a special canon of construction applies to Indian treaty
interpretation, the district court cited several reasons for its affirmance.263 The
court cited Supreme Court precedent that held “the history of the treaty, the
negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties should . . . be

258
Herrera v. Wyoming, No. CV 2016-242, at 16 –18 (4th Wyo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 25, 2017), review
denied, No. S-17-0129 (Wyo. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (mem.) (No. 17-532),
vacated, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/17532-opinion-below.pdf.
259

See supra notes 147– 61 and accompanying text.

260

See id.

Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 581 (1832). The United States Supreme Court most
recently interpreted an Indian treaty in Cougar Den. See Wash. State Dep’t of Licencing v. Cougar
Den, Inc., No. 16-1498, 2019 WL 1245535 (2019). In determining whether an 1855 treaty
between the United States and the Yakama Nation forbade the State of Washington from imposing
a tax on Yakama Nation fuel importers, the Court applied the same Indian canon of construction
and similar interpretive methods as the district court in Herrera. Id. The Supreme Court stated “the
language of the treaty should be understood as bearing the meaning that the Yakamas understood it
to have in 1855.” Cougar Den, 2019 WL 1245535, at *1005. This statement embodies the Indian
canon that “[t]he language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their
prejudice.” Worchestire v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 581 (1832). Furthermore, the Court recognized
that “to interpret the treaty, courts must focus upon the historical context in which it was written
and signed.” Cougar Den, 2019 WL 1245535, at *1012. This language similarly echoes the district
court’s reliance on the Repsis finding regarding the history of the treaty. See Herrera, No. CV 2016242 at 17.
261

262
See Worchester, 31 U.S. at 551; Note, Indian Canon Originalism, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1100,
1103 (2013).
263

See Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 17.
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considered.”264 The district court opined that Race Horse applied these interpretive
methods when the Court analyzed the Crow Treaty.265 In so doing, the Race Horse
Court held:
Doubtless the rule that treaties should be so construed as to
uphold the sanctity of the public faith ought not to be departed
from. But that salutary rule should not be made an instrument
for violating the public faith by distorting the words of a treaty,
in order to imply that it conveyed rights wholly inconsistent
with the its language, and in conflict with an act of congress,
and also destructive of the rights of one of the states.266
Race Horse therefore suggests that the Indian canon of construction should not
be used to distort the words of a treaty, and also should not be extended to a
degree where the canon destroys state rights or congressional intent.267 Because
Race Horse found the Bannock Treaty language (which is identical to the Crow
Treaty language) to be “temporary and precarious” in nature, the Indian canon
of construction and other interpretive methods could not save the Treaty hunting
right from the rights and authority of the State of Wyoming and Congress.268
Although treaty language should never be construed to prejudice an Indian tribe,
the history of the Crow Treaty, the negotiations behind the Treaty, and the Treaty’s
practical meaning as adopted by the parties compelled the Supreme Court to hold
that the parties intended the Treaty hunting right to be abrogated by Wyoming
statehood.269 Repsis quoted the same Indian canon of construction set forth by
Justice Marshall.270 The Tenth Circuit went on to find that the Supreme Court
in Race Horse understood this canon of construction and declined to validate the
Treaty so as to uphold the rights of Congress and the states.271

264

Id. (citing Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1943)).

Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 17. The district court did not directly state where the
Supreme Court utilized canons of construction in Race Horse. See generally id. However, Race Horse
stated “[t]he elucidation of this issue will be made plain by an appreciation of the situation existing
at the time of the adoption of the treaty, of the necessities which brought it into being, and of the
purposes intended to be by it accomplished.” Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 508 (1896).
265

266

Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 516; Herrera, No. CV 2016-242 at 17.

267

See Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 516.

268

Id. at 514 –16.

269

Id.

Repsis II, 73 F.3d 982, 992 (10th Cir. 1995) (“The language used in treaties with the
Indians should never be construed to their prejudice. If words be made use of, which are susceptible
of a more extended meaning than their plain import, as connected with the tenor of the treaty,
they should be considered as used only in the latter sense . . . . How the words of the treaty were
understood by this unlettered people, rather than their critical meaning, should form the rule of
construction.” (quoting Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 582 (1832))).
270

271

See id. at 992.
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The district court also considered another goal of treaty interpretation:
determining the intent of the parties.272 Race Horse and Repsis determined that the
parties intended for the Treaty to expire upon certain conditions, including upon
Wyoming acquiring statehood.273 Mille Lacs expressly stated that “[t]reaty rights
are not impliedly terminated upon statehood.”274 However, contrary to Herrera’s
assertions, Race Horse and Repsis did not hold that statehood impliedly terminated
the Treaty hunting right.275 Instead, those courts found the parties agreed to the
Treaty language without intent to grant perpetual rights, and the language itself
was “temporary and precarious.”276 If the parties intended the Treaty rights to be
perpetual, the parties would not have employed such “temporary and precarious”
language.277 Thus, Wyoming statehood did not impliedly terminate the
usufructuary right, but rather triggered a condition that the parties contemplated
when executing the Treaty.278
Because the Supreme Court decided Race Horse in the 19th century, the
precedent provides both legal and historical value.279 The Crow Treaty was
executed almost exactly twenty-eight years before the Supreme Court decided
Race Horse.280 Due to this relatively short period of time, the Supreme Court in the
19th century likely possessed a greater sense of the intention of the Treaty parties
than the Supreme Court today, which is separated from the Treaty’s execution by
over 150 years.281 Not only does Race Horse remain binding despite Mille Lacs, it
provides the clearest evidence of what persons in the 19th century believed the
Crow Treaty language to mean.282 As Justice Cardozo once stated, “[h]istory or
custom . . . or sometimes perhaps a semi-intuitive apprehension of the pervading
spirit of our law, must come to the rescue of the anxious judge, and tell him

272
Herrera v. Wyoming, No. CV 2016-242, at 17 (4th Wyo Dist. Ct. Apr. 25, 2017), cert.
granted, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (mem.) (No. 17-532), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019), https://
www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/17-532-opinion-below.pdf (citing Washington
v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979)).
273

See Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504; Repsis II, 73 F.3d 982.

274

Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 207 (1999).

275

See generally Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504; Repsis II, 73 F.3d 982.

276

Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 515; Repsis II, 73 F.3d at 991.

277

See supra notes 135–41 and accompanying text.

278

See supra notes 135–41 and accompanying text.

279

See Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504.

Race Horse was decided on May 25, 1896. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504. The Crow Treaty was
executed on May 7, 1868. See Treaty with the Crows, May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649.
280

281
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Herrera v. Wyoming, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018)
(mem.) (No. 17-532), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/
2018/17-532_c07e.pdf; infra note 283 and accompanying text. The Crow Treaty was executed on
May 7, 1868. See Treaty with the Crows, May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649.

See supra notes 241–52 and accompanying text; Transcript of Oral Argument at 44,
Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532).
282
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where to go.”283 In considering historical value, the district court properly gave
weight to the Supreme Court’s determination in 1896 that the Crow Treaty was
“temporary and precarious” in nature, and that Wyoming statehood abrogated
the hunting right.284

2. The Creation of the Bighorn National Forest “Occupied” Ceded Land
The district court emphasized the Tenth Circuit’s alternative finding in Repsis
that “the creation of the Big Horn National Forest resulted in the ‘occupation’ of
the land.”285 The Repsis court stated that, when the national forest was created,
the “lands were no longer available for settlement.”286 It found that because the
national forest exists, “[n]o longer could anyone timber, mine, log, graze cattle,
or homestead on these lands without federal permission.”287 Because the Repsis
court found the land was no longer “unoccupied,” a condition expressly
contemplated by the parties to the Crow Treaty occurred and abrogated the Treaty
hunting right.288
This governmental control is similar to another swath of federal land:
Yellowstone National Park. At the time of the Crow Treaty’s execution, the area
that is now Yellowstone was within the “hunting district” that the Crow ceded to
the federal government.289 Less than four years after the execution of the Treaty, the
federal government created Yellowstone.290 By 1894, Congress passed legislation
prohibiting hunting within Yellowstone.291 By setting this land aside, the federal
283

Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of Judicial Process 43 (Yale University Press, 1921).

284

See Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504.

Herrera v. Wyoming, No. CV 2016-242, at 17 (4th Wyo Dist. Ct. Apr. 25, 2017), cert.
granted, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (mem.) (No. 17-532), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019), https://
www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/17-532-opinion-below.pdf (citing Repsis II, 73
F.3d 982, 993 (10th Cir. 1995)).
285

286

Repsis II, 73 F.3d at 993.

287

Id.

The Crow Treaty reads: “[The Crow] shall have the right to hunt on the unoccupied lands
of the United States . . . .” Treaty with the Crows, art. 4. Since the land is deemed occupied, this
terminating condition of the Treaty is satisfied. See Repsis II, 73 F.3d at 993.
288

289
Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Herrera v. Wyoming, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (mem.) (No.
17-532), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2018/17-532_
c07e.pdf.

President Ulysses S. Grant created Yellowstone National Park on March 1, 1872 when he
signed the Yellowstone National Park Protection Act into law. Yellowstone National Park Protection
Act, ch. 72 § 4, 28 Stat. 73 (1894) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 26 (2006)).
290

Jessica Almy, Taking Aim at Hunting on National Park Service Lands, 18 N.Y.U. Envtl.
L.J. 184, 196 (2010) (citing Yellowstone National Park Protection Act, ch. 72, § 4). Additionally,
the federal government dictates what seasons and hours of the day visitors may access Yellowstone
National Park. Yellowstone National Park Operating Hours and Seasons, Nat’l Park Serv., https://
www.nps.gov/yell/planyourvisit/hours.htm (last update Apr. 2, 2019). The government also
regulates fees for all visitors. Yellowstone National Park Fees & Passes, Nat’l Park Serv., https://www.
291

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2019

29

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 19 [2019], No. 2, Art. 9

300

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 19

government’s control effectively “occupied” the land.292 Although the land is
not settled by non-Indians and remains primarily wild, the federal government
limited its use through control over the land.293
Similarly, the federal government exercises control over the Bighorn National
Forest.294 President Cleveland’s proclamation creating the national forest explicitly
states “the President of the United States may, from time to time, set apart and
reserve, in any State . . . public reservations, and . . . declare the establishment
of such reservations and the limits thereof.”295 The proclamation also states that
“[w]arning is hereby expressly given to all persons not to enter or make settlement
upon the tract of land reserved by this proclamation.”296 The proclamation has
the effect of occupying the land because the government may control the national
forest by dictating the activities and the length of visitors’ stay on the land.297
Because the Treaty requires land to be unoccupied, the terminating condition of
occupation was satisfied through Bighorn National Forest’s creation, and thereby
abrogated the Tribe’s usufructuary right to hunt under the Treaty.298

3. The Conservation Necessity Doctrine Does Not Adequately Protect
State Interests
Although states retain no power to abrogate federal treaties, the Supreme
Court has declared that states may regulate game through “an appropriate
exercise of the police power of the State.”299 The Supreme Court has recognized
nps.gov/yell/planyourvisit/fees.htm (last updated Dec. 17, 2018). For more information on park
regulations, see Yellowstone National Park Fees & Passes, Nat’l Park Serv., https://www.nps.gov/yell/
planyourvisit/rules.htm (last updated Dec. 22, 2017).
Brief for Respondent at 49–53, Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532), https://www.
supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-532/71707/20181113153510005_Respondent%20
Herrera%2017-532.pdf; Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532).
292

293

Brief for Respondent at 49–51, Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532).

See Proclamation No. 30, 29 Stat. 909; Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. G at App-47 to
-48, Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532).
294

295
Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. G at App-47, Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532)
(Pres. Proclamation No. 30, 29 Stat. 909) (emphasis added).
296

Id. app. G at App-48 (Pres. Proclamation No. 30, 29 Stat. 909).

Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532); Big Horn
National Forest Recreation Rules and Regulation, U.S. Dep’t Agric. Forest Serv. https://www.
fs.usda.gov/detailfull/bighorn/recreation/?cid=stelprdb5312215&width=full (last visited Apr. 17,
2019) (limiting length of stay within the national forest to fourteen days within any twenty-eightday period).
297

298
See Treaty with the Crows, art. 4 (“[T]hey shall have the right to hunt on the unoccupied
lands of the United States . . . .”).
299
Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game of Wash. (Puyallup I), 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968). The
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides: “all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby. . . .” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
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that states may regulate certain off-reservation Indian treaty rights “in the
interest of conservation, provided the regulation meets appropriate standards
and does not discriminate against the Indians.”300 Any regulation must also be
“reasonable and necessary.”301 When enforcing game regulations through this
conservation necessity doctrine, states face a “formidable burden in showing the
necessity of such regulation[s].”302 Federal courts have exhibited inconsistencies
in interpreting the scope of the conservation necessity doctrine.303 States must
meet varying standards to satisfy the necessity standard depending on federal
jurisdiction.304 Further complicating the issue, the Supreme Court has not
recently decided the scope of the conservation necessity doctrine, and declined
to do so in the final determination of Herrera.305 Due to the unsettled nature
of the doctrine’s scope, Wyoming’s interest in regulating game may be in peril
if the Supreme Court declares the Treaty right valid. However, the Repsis court
previously held that Wyoming’s game regulations are reasonable and necessary
for regulation.306
The court in Repsis considered Wyoming’s right to regulate game for
conservation in two ways.307 First, the court held that, because Wyoming statehood
abrogated the Tribe’s right to hunt, “the Tribe and its members are subject to
Wyoming’s game laws and regulations regardless of whether the regulations are
reasonable and necessary for conservation.”308 Second, in the event that the
Treaty reserved a continuing right which survived statehood, the court held that
evidence in the record supported the contention that Wyoming game regulations
were reasonable and necessary for conservation.309

300
Repsis II, 73 F.3d 982, 992 (citing Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 398 (emphasis added)). See also
Transcript of Oral Argument at 57, Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532) (statement of Justice
Kavanaugh) (“[T]here is still preserved in the cases a right in the state to regulate in the interest of
conservation.”).
301

See Dep’t of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup II ), 414 U.S. 44, 45 (1973).

Zachary Tomlinson, Abrogation or Regulation? How Anderson v. Evans Discards the Makah’s
Treaty Whaling Right in the Name of Conservation Necessity, 78 Wash. L. Rev. 1101, 1111 (2003).
302

303

See id. at 1110.

See, e.g., United States v. Michigan, 653 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding state regulation
valid only if Indian fishing is likely to cause “irreparable harm” to fisheries); Sohappy v. Smith, 302
F. Supp. 899, 908 (D. Or. 1969) (holding that Oregon may “use its police power only to the extent
necessary to prevent the exercise of [a treaty] right in a manner that will imperil the continued
existence of the fish resource”); United States v. Oregon, 718 F.2d 299, 305 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating
that the purpose of the conservation necessity doctrine is to “forestall the imminence of extinction”).
304

Transcript of Oral Argument at 59, Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532); Herrera v.
Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1702–03 (2019).
305

306

See supra note 56 and accompanying text.

307

Repsis II, 73 F.3d 982, 992–93 (10th Cir. 1995).

308

Id.

309

Id. at 993.
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As to the former finding, the Repsis court properly determined that if
statehood abrogated the Treaty hunting rights, the conservation necessity doctrine
did not apply because there were no off-reservation treaty rights to regulate.310
Considering the court’s latter finding, Repsis provided that if Treaty rights did
exist, state authority properly regulated the rights under the conservation
necessity doctrine.311 Prior to the Mille Lacs decision, Race Horse determined that
the Treaty hunting right and statehood are “irreconcilable.”312 Importantly, Mille
Lacs rejected this holding, stating that “an Indian tribe’s treaty rights to hunt, fish,
and gather on state land are not irreconcilable with a State’s sovereignty over the
natural resources in the State.”313 Therefore, Mille Lacs stands for the proposition
that if treaty rights exist, they can still be regulated by the state with “reasonable
and necessary nondiscriminatory regulations on Indian hunting” if they are in the
interest of conservation.314
The conservation necessity doctrine’s purpose is a means to “forestall the
imminence of extinction.”315 Simply forestalling extinction does not contemplate
safety concerns or disease management at the level that Wyoming has legislated.316
Significant gaps exist between what Wyoming wishes to regulate and what the
State may be permitted to regulate under the conservation necessity doctrine.317
The Repsis court previously found that Wyoming game laws were reasonable
and necessary for conservation.318 Because of the finding in Repsis, Crow Tribe
members should be required to abide by current Wyoming hunting regulations
when hunting in the State, even if the Treaty hunting right survives.319 However,
if Wyoming regulations are determined not to be reasonable and necessary in the
future, the conservation necessity may fail to adequately protect state interests
such as hunter safety and mitigation of wildlife and livestock disease.320

310

Id. at 992 –93.

311

See id. at 993.

312

Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 514 (1896).

Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 204 (1999) (citing
Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979)).
313

314
Id. at 205 (citing Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game of Wash. (Puyallup I ), 391 U.S. 392,
398 (1968)).
315

United States v. Oregon, 718 F.2d 299, 305 (9th Cir. 1983).

See id.; Transcript of Oral Argument at 60, Herrera v. Wyoming, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018)
(mem.) (No. 17-532), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2018
17-532_c07e.pdf.
316

317

Transcript of Oral Argument at 60, Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532).

318

See supra note 309 and accompanying text.

319

Repsis II, 73 F.3d 982, 993 (10th Cir. 1995).

Wyoming possesses several regulatory interests when managing hunting. See Transcript of
Oral Argument at 60, Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532). One regulatory interest is safety. Id.
Current regulations limit the duration of hunting seasons. See generally Regulations, Wyo. Game
320
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V. Conclusion
The Wyoming District Court correctly held Race Horse previously adjudicated
the validity of the Crow Treaty hunting right, and that issue preclusion applied
to Herrera.321 Furthermore, the merits of Herrera support the district court’s
holding that the Treaty hunting right was abrogated.322 Because Mille Lacs merely
distinguished itself from Race Horse and Repsis, the “temporary and precarious”
nature of the Treaty language compelled a finding that terminating conditions
within the Treaty abrogated the Tribe’s hunting right: Wyoming statehood and
the establishment of the Bighorn National Forest.323 These terminating conditions
rendered the land “occupied.”324 Because the United States Supreme Court
declined to rule on the conservation necessity doctrine, issues are still unsettled
regarding Wyoming’s ability to regulate hunting under the doctrine.325 Despite the
final determination of the United States Supreme Court, the Wyoming district
court properly supported its holding of Herrera.

& Fish Dep’t, https://wgfd.wyo.gov/Regulations (last visited Apr. 17, 2019). These defined time
periods ensure that all people on lands within Wyoming, whether state of federal, know that no
hunting occurs on the lands outside of designated seasons. Transcript of Oral Argument at 60,
Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532). Wyoming law requires big game hunters to wear fluorescent
orange or pink exterior garments in the name of safety. Hunting in Wyoming, Wyo. Game & Fish
Dep’t, https://wgfd.wyo.gov/Hunting/What-do-I-need-to-Hunt (last visited Apr. 17, 2019).
Further yet, Wyoming requires proof that certain hunters have obtained a certificate of competency
and safety in the use of handling firearms to persons born after 1966. Id. Also, firearms may only
be fired at certain times of day. Transcript of Oral Argument at 61, Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No.
17-532); 40-2 Wyo. Code R. § 5(a) (LexisNexis 2019). The State additionally employs measures
that authorize taking samples from harvested game to determine whether diseases such as Brucellosis
exist. Transcript of Oral Argument at 61, Herrera, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (No. 17-532).
321

See supra notes 174–257 and accompanying text.

322

See supra notes 258–98 and accompanying text.

323

See supra notes 242–98 and accompanying text.

324

See supra notes 242–98 and accompanying text.

325

See supra notes 299–314 and accompanying text.
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